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Abstract. The most inﬂuential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders’
supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to
generate and transfer ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the
widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be
increasingly aligned to shareholder’ interests by making the board more responsible to
shareholders, and monitoring of top management by independent outside directors should be
strengthened. Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-
speciﬁc knowledge investments are, like ﬁnancial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving
investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make ﬁrm-
speciﬁc investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive
to undertake such ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this
dilemma: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insiders should be elected by
those employees of the ﬁrm who are making ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge investments. (3) The board
should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they provide
incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they
encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the ﬁrm by strengthening distributive and
procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs.
These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate gover-
nance is in. At the same time, they provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of
the ﬁrm as a basis for corporate governance.
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1. Introduction
Recent corporate scandals have turned the spotlight on corporate gover-
nance. Numerous suggestions have been made to how the eﬃciency of the
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boards could be improved, but only a few of these suggestions have taken
into account what today is common understanding in the strategic man-
agement literature, namely that the key task of ﬁrm governance is to gen-
erate, accumulate, transfer and protect valuable knowledge and capability
(e.g. Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1996;
Spender, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Foss and Foss, 2000). In particular, the
main approach in the corporate governance discussion, the view of share-
holders’ supremacy, disregards knowledge work aspects. It has a marked
inﬂuence on the present discussion, both in theory and practice (Daily et al.,
2003). This approach contends that the key activity of boards is to monitor
management on behalf of shareholders. It does not diﬀerentiate between
governing the management of physical and knowledge work.
In the second section, we present various theoretical approaches to
the theory of the ﬁrm which underpin diﬀerent suggestions for improv-
ing corporate governance: the traditional view of the ﬁrm as a nexus of
explicit contracts, the view of the ﬁrm as a nexus of ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments
and our view of the ﬁrm as a nexus of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge investments.
We show that each approach leads to diﬀerent conclusions with respect to
corporate governance and argue that the two ﬁrst approaches have
major shortcomings. In the third section, we make our own suggestions
for improving corporate governance. In the fourth and ﬁfth sections, we
discuss arguments in favor of and against our proposal. We conclude by
stating that corporate governance reform must be based on an adequate
theory of the ﬁrm that integrates theories of value generation and value
distribution.
2. Alternative Theoretical Views on Corporate Governance
2.1. THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
The dominant view of corporate governance is a particular application of
agency and property rights theory. It ﬁrst assumes that shareholders should
have supremacy and second that there exists in the modern corporation a
conﬂict of interest between shareholders as principals and managers as
agents. Though these assumptions do not necessarily follow from agency and
property rights theory (Grandori, 2004, p. 4), they are typically so stated in
the corporate governance literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). They
have been derived from the view of the ﬁrm as a nexus of contracts (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976).
The current main idea ‘‘oﬃcial view of corporate governance’’ (Bebchuk
and Fried, 2004) is that there exists a conﬂict of interest between managers
(agents) and shareholders (principals), caused by the separation of ownership
and control in public corporations (Berle and Means, 1932). In order to align
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their interests, the control of management must be transferred to the board of
directors as a second level of agency (e.g. Black, 1992). To achieve better
alignment of interests of directors and managers with those of shareholders
the pay of managers and directors should be tied to their performance and
the independence of the board should be strengthened (e.g. Jensen and
Murphy, 1990; Jensen, 1993).
The wave of corporate scandals and the explosion of management com-
pensation drew attention to ﬂaws in the corporate governance structure
according to this ‘‘oﬃcial view’’. Even its proponents now admit that the
explosion of executives’ and directors’ pay has proven to be ‘managerial and
organizational heroin’ (Jensen et al., 2004, p. 45). Critics speak of ‘pay
without performance’ (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). In order to improve
Corporate Governance, mainly two measures have been discussed:
First, the board should become more independent of their CEOs in order
to monitor them more eﬃciently. The board should operate at arms’ length
from the executives. As a result, the board would be less inclined to tolerate
the rent-seeking behavior of CEOs. Boards too closely linked to executives
hinder market forces, like the markets for capital, corporate control and
managerial labor, from imposing stringent constraints on managers. Rather,
they frequently see themselves as subordinates of the CEO. Therefore, the
CEO should be the only insider of the ﬁrm with board membership (Jensen
et al., 2004, p. 55).
Second, the board should become more responsible to their shareholders.
Board members should be made more attentive to the shareholders’ interests.
For instance, board members should stand for annual election by the
shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).
The idea of board independence has been widely accepted but does not
seem to contribute much to solving the problem. Most importantly, it has not
led to pay moderation of CEOs and other managers. The stronger depen-
dency of directors on shareholders might even have fueled the pay explosion,
because in speculative markets it tends to align interests of CEOs to short-
term share price maximization (Bolton et al., in press). In addition, a
meta-analysis of ﬁfty-four studies on board dependence shows no statistical
relationship between board independence and ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance
(Dalton et al. 1998).
The conﬂict of interests between managers and shareholders discussed is
based on the idea of shareholders’ supremacy in the ﬁrm as a nexus of con-
tracts. In this view, the ﬁrm is ‘a legal ﬁction which serves as a focus for the
complex process in which the conﬂicting objectives of individuals ... are
brought in equilibrium within a framework of contractual relationship’
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 312). All possible conﬂicts between share-
holders and other stakeholders (including the employees) can be solved
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ex ante by contracts. Only shareholders carry a residual risk and should
therefore have residual ownership and control. As a consequence, directors
should act solely in the interests of the shareholders, because it is not possible
to maximize more than one objective (Jensen, 2001).
As the intensive recent discussion in the Journal of Management and
Governance (Asher et al., 2005; Blair, 2005; Grandori, 2005) demonstrates,
belief in shareholders’ supremacy is inadequate when it comes to carrying out
a theoretical analysis of today’s ﬁrms, which gain their competitive advantage
through knowledge rather than physical investments. It would be surprising
if proposals derived from an inadequate theory could lead to successful
practical implications.
2.2. THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF FIRM-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS
The nexus of contract view is misleading and projects a legalistic picture of
the ﬁrm (Zingales, 2000). Although de jure equity is the only residual con-
tract, de facto ﬁrms’ decisions have a strong impact on other members of the
nexus, sometimes to an even greater extent than the impact on shareholders.
This argument has been taken up by proponents of the theory of incomplete
contracts. They argue that shareholders’ supremacy is nevertheless justiﬁed
because they have fewer contractual safeguards than other stakeholders
(Williamson, 1985). Hansmann (1996) argues that the costs of (external and
internal) decision-making between diﬀerent stakeholders should be taken
into account. There exists a preference for leaving the ultimate decisions to
the shareholders, because the interests among shareholders have the highest
degree of homogeneity.
In contrast, Blair (1995), Zingales (1998), and Blair and Stout (1999) argue
that it is not in the interest of the shareholders to be the exclusive owners of
residual control. Firms exist because they produce what are commonly called
quasi-rents (Klein et al., 1978) or synergies (Foss and Iversen, 1997). Quasi-
rents represent the diﬀerence between what the parties inside the ﬁrm jointly
generate and what each of them can obtain in the market. Quasi-rents are the
outcome of mutually specialized assets of people who make ﬁrm-speciﬁc
investments (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). These investments cannot, or only at
high cost, be protected by contracts ex ante when the parties enter into a
relationship. They represent transaction-speciﬁc investments that cause sunk
costs once the contract has been made and are subjected to hold up. What
matters is that investors’ ex post bargaining position is weakened when the
quasi-rents are divided (e.g. by discussing their wages after entering
the contract). Their ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment is of little or no value outside the
ﬁrm and decreases their outside opportunities during the term of the con-
tract. It is primarily employees who are aﬀected by such hold up. It has been
shown empirically that employees who are forced to ﬁnd new jobs lose, on
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average, 15 percent of their wages (Osterman, 1999). If they were employed in
the ﬁrm for more than 21 years, they stand to lose as much as 44 percent of
their wages (Topel, 1991). As a consequence, employees have no incentive to
undertake ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments if their bargaining position is not pro-
tected after they enter into the labor contract (Freeman and Lazear, 1996).
This critique of the view of the ﬁrm as a nexus of contracts leads to a view
of the ﬁrm as a nexus of ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments (Blair and Stout, 1999).
These ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments create room for ex post bargaining after the
contracts have been ﬁnalized. For this reason, corporate governance can be
deﬁned as a set of constraints shaping the ex post bargaining over the joint
output of ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments (Zingales, 1998). Blair and Stout (1999,
2001) claim that it is the board that has to take over the task of governing the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments and mediating between possible conﬂicting interests
of investors in ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets, which cannot be contracted ex ante. In
Blair and Stout’s view, the board should act as a neutral third party, which is
not involved in ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments. It should act as an impartial
‘mediating hierarch’ and therefore should consist mainly of outside directors.
This proposal constitutes a pioneering development in the corporate gov-
ernment discussion, but should be expanded upon. In particular, this proposal
envisages voting rights only given to shareholders, thus maintaining share-
holders’ supremacy. As Aglietta and Reberioux (2005, p. 40) criticize, Blair
and Stout (1999) ‘‘give voting rights to shareholders less for analytical reasons
speciﬁc to their model and more for shaping this model to ﬁt US reality’’.
2.3. THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF KNOWLEDGE-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS
Blair and Stout’s proposal is important but nevertheless neglects to address
the crucial diﬀerences between ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments in knowledge and
physical or ﬁnancial capital. There are fundamental diﬀerences between ﬁrm-
speciﬁc investments in knowledge and physical goods. These diﬀerences are
neither addressed in Blair and Stout‘s proposal nor in the proposal advanced
by Aglietta and Reberioux (2005). First, as far as knowledge investments are
concerned, it is not only too expensive to contract ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments
ex ante before entering a contract, but it is simply impossible. A knowledge
worker cannot contract his or her future knowledge as such due to the
‘‘knowledge paradox’’ highlighted by Arrow (1973, p. 171): The value of
knowledge invested in the potential acquirer is not known until after the
knowledge is revealed. Once revealed, the potential acquirer has no need to
pay for it.
Second, the generation of knowledge cannot be evaluated in the same way
as physical goods during the contract term. Only insiders or peers can
evaluate ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge generation and transformation, because
outsiders are rarely able to comprehend the processes involved. Outside
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directors usually evaluate knowledge investments by judging the ﬁnancial
consequences of knowledge encapsulated in marketable products or projects
successfully carried out. They are not able to evaluate the quality of the
knowledge process itself, and are thus not able to protect knowledge inves-
tors from a deterioration of their bargaining position during the interim
period when joint knowledge has not yet led to a recoverable output.
Third, the information asymmetry between management and outside
directors leads to the external board members being dependent on executives
for information. Under present conditions, a board dominated by outside
directors has to rely largely on information provided by the top executives. In
most cases, the CEO sets the agenda for the board. Most of the information
that board members receive originated from the CEO. It rarely happens that
the board meets without the CEO’s presence (Jensen et al., 2004, p. 54).
All these arguments suggest that ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge investments are
crucial for a sustained competitive advantage for the ﬁrm – which is a widely
shared view today – and corporate governance should involve inside
knowledge workers in the decision-making process of the ﬁrms’ boards.
There are two justiﬁcations. First, according to the knowledge-based view,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge, in particular of a tacit nature, is the most critical
resource. Outside board members cannot understand the ﬁrm’s tacit
knowledge base and its strategic relevance (Coﬀ, 1999, p. 126; Barney, 2005,
p. 946). Second, contractual provisions such as regulating exit, the vesting of
options and repayment schemes are in most cases no valid alternative to
board representation of knowledge workers. The reason is that the under-
lying conﬂicts between shareholders and knowledge workers concerning the
appropriation of the quasi rents appear in full force only at the level of the
board where all conﬂicting parties should be represented. Thus, these con-
ﬂicts cannot be resolved by a human resource manager, working at a lower
level. This is in line with the deﬁnition of corporate governance provided by
Zingales (1998) cited above (see also Hart, 1995, p. 679). Such conﬂict res-
olution is also in the interests of the shareholders themselves as it leads to an
increase in the value of the ﬁrm. How this can be achieved is discussed in the
following section.
3. New Proposals for Corporate Governance
The distinct characteristics of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge investments justify that
knowledge workers are represented on the board. All other stakeholders,
with the exception of shareholders, are better able to form ex ante contracts
and therefore need not be represented on the board. Knowledge is indeed a
special resource unlike any other resources, as highlighted by Arrow´s (1973)
knowledge paradox: All other resources can in principle be contracted,
though sometimes at a high cost. This is not the case for knowledge as long as
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it is not encapsulated in a marketable product. Moreover, even in this case
the problem of attributing the contribution of each worker to the product is
unresolved. Thus, the knowledge workers and the shareholders should be
involved in the residual control as they bear the brunt of the non-contractible
residual risk. Contrary to what has been proposed by the dominant view of
shareholders’ supremacy, this leads us to propose board arrangements:
– First, the board should rely more on insiders. The percentage of insiders
relative to outsiders should be determined by the relationship of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc knowledge capital to ﬁnancial capital.
– Second, these insiders should be elected by, and responsible for, those
employees of the ﬁrm making ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge investments. The
board should no longer be solely an instrument of ﬁnancial investors,
but also an instrument of knowledge investors, and should have the task
of aligning the interests of these constituents.
– Third, a neutral person should chair the board. His or her main task is
to enable the board members to engage in a productive discourse to the
mutual beneﬁt of all members of the ﬁrm. Moreover, he or she has to
ensure that the conditions are such that the board members are
prepared to contribute to the ﬁrm’s common good, and to refrain from
rent seeking.
The next subsections discuss these three proposals in more detail.
3.1. INSIDERS ON THE BOARD
Insiders of the ﬁrm, especially those who are knowledge workers, have three
major advantages over outsiders on the board.1 First, they are better
informed about the issues and problems concerning the ﬁrm’s business
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hillmann and Dalziel, 2003), in particular
they can better understand the ﬁrm’s tacit knowledge base (Coﬀ, 1999,
p. 126). The more important the ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is, and the more
diversiﬁed and decentralized the organization structure of a company is, the
less knowledge is shared with outsiders on the board about what is really
going on in the ﬁrm (Child and Rodrigues, 2003). Outside directors are able
to monitor executives mainly through exerting output control, based upon
clearly deﬁned performance targets (Ouchi, 1978). They have only limited
control over the transformation processes, which help evaluating the per-
formance when innovative knowledge work is crucial. The more ﬁrms
compete on the basis of innovation, the more this applies. In times of high
uncertainty and rapid change, it is no longer possible to maintain control
through targets set by hierarchical control, because targets in these cases have
to be reset at regular intervals. It follows that control has to be based on a
mutually agreed, ongoing revision of goals that take into account new search
procedures. Such a procedural control is similar to the one commonly used in
SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD WELCOME KNOWLEDGE WORKERS AS DIRECTORS 331
various professions. It is not possible to evaluate the quality of performance
from outside, but only from mutual monitoring on the inside. Our proposal
applies the insight of organization theory that the decision rights should be
assigned to the actors possessing relevant knowledge in the design of cor-
porate governance (Grandori, 2004, p. 5).
A second important advantage of having insiders on the board is that it
lessens the board’s dependence on CEOs for supplying information.
Knowledge workers as directors are a well-informed source of inside infor-
mation not ﬁltered by the CEOs. These inside directors have superior explicit
knowledge, as well as tacit knowledge, on the speciﬁc issues and problems
facing the ﬁrm. At the same time, insiders mitigate the problem of double
agency-relationship. The ﬁrst consists of owners and management, the sec-
ond of management and employees (Child and Rodrigues, 2004). The inside
directors are able to bridge the gap between these groups.
Third, it is not in the interests of outside executive directors, who are also
CEOs of other ﬁrms, to seriously challenge the policies, especially the
remuneration of executives. It is well known that outside CEOs view the
board through CEO eyes, i.e. through a lens, which does not seriously
challenge the power of the CEO. For example, a study by O’Reilly et al.
(1988) found that the pay of the compensation committee members was a
better predictor of CEO compensation than the actual performance of the
ﬁrm. Thus, the membership of employees in the compensation committees
would have a moderating eﬀect upon the mutual hiking up of compensations
by the cross-board membership of outside CEOs.
The three advantages might be criticized by arguing that knowledge
workers, as employees of the ﬁrm, are subservient to the interests of the
executives to whom they are subordinated in the ﬁrm’s hierarchy. But, as we
will argue in the next section, these knowledge directors gain a measure of
independence by being elected by, and responsible to, the body of knowledge
investors in the ﬁrm.
3.2. REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE INVESTORS ON THE BOARD
To solve the problem that contracts cannot be formed ex ante and that the
insiders may be subservient to the very managers whom they are supposed to
control, we propose an institutional solution: Financial and knowledge
investors should be represented on the board. Other stakeholders and
employees with no ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments are better able to contract their
contributions to the ﬁrm ex ante. Suppliers of plant equipment, for example,
normally retain the equipment as long as they have not received full payment.
The claims of employees with no ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments are also ex ante
contractible via market wages. Therefore, these groups do not need protec-
tion via representation on the board. In contrast, the whole investment of a
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shareholder is placed at risk of becoming a residual claim (Williamson, 1985).
The same applies to the investors in ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. To protect
them, and to give them an incentive to invest, these groups must be repre-
sented on the board.
The relationship of the two groups ought to be proportional to the rela-
tion of investment in ﬁnancial capital and investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge capital. As a consequence, in a ﬁrm in which ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge investment is very important, the board should contain a large
percentage of representatives of knowledge investors. An example are
members of a design team who make an eﬀort to learn ‘who knows what’, so
contributing to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc transactive memory (Wegner, 1986; Moreland,
1999). In addition, they invest in developing knowledge that complements the
knowledge of other team members to raise joint output (Coﬀ, 1999). If such
an employee has to leave the ﬁrm she has not only lost her relational capital
but cannot convincingly show to another employer what her contribution
was worth. Investing in such a way means losing bargaining power compared
to investment in general marketable knowledge.2 In contrast, knowledge that
has the same marketable value irrespective of the ﬁrm in which it is used,
should not be represented on the board. Examples are professionals working
in consultancies, accounting ﬁrms or legal companies, who often have closer
relationships to their customers than to their ﬁrm. When they decide to work
for another company, they often take their customers with them and have no
sunk costs.
There are several proposals for measuring knowledge capital (e.g.
Strassmann, 1999; Bontis, 2001; Lev, 2001; Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2003).
To get the ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment of employees in knowledge capital, the
knowledge capital must be reduced by a factor, which, on the one hand,
captures the average reduction in wages employees of the ﬁrm would suﬀer if
they had to work in another ﬁrm. On the other hand, it should include the
average investment the ﬁrm has made in the knowledge of its employees. This
calculation requires an econometric analysis in which average wage rates in
the ﬁrm are estimated, depending on a set of individual characteristics of the
employees, as well as a variable that measures the time each employee spent
in the ﬁrm. As an alternative to this intricate process, a ﬁrm could voluntarily
oﬀer its employees a share of seats in the board corresponding to the
attractiveness it desires to exhibit towards potential contributors to ﬁrm
speciﬁc knowledge. Such a procedure has the advantage of being future
oriented.
We suggest that each employee has voting rights, according to his or her
ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment. It ranges from zero to one. The size of this
investment is captured by the estimated individual reduction in wage an
employee would sustain if he or she had to transfer to another ﬁrm.
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Employees who sustain no estimated loss from having invested in their ﬁrm
speciﬁc knowledge, or who gain an estimated net proﬁt from knowledge
investments by the ﬁrm, should have no vote. The econometric analysis to
calculate individual wage reductions or gains must include a large set of
personal characteristics of the employees, as well as a variable capturing the
fact of having been an employee of the ﬁrm in question. If the coeﬃcient of
this latter variable is negative, the employee suﬀers a loss due to having
invested knowledge in the ﬁrm in question. In that case, the group of
employees meeting these characteristics should have the right to vote
according to the size of the coeﬃcient econometrically estimated. Again, the
procedure can be facilitated and turned future oriented by voluntarily
oﬀering potential contributors to ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge the right to vote
for their representatives in the board.
3.3. NEUTRAL CHAIR OF THE BOARD
We envisage a neutral chair, whose task it would be to guarantee an open
discussion on the board so that all aspects can be duly considered. He or
she should establish, as good as they can, what has been called an ideal
speech situation (Habermas, 1987; Steinmann, 1990). In particular, he or
she has to make sure that the procedural rules are strictly observed and that
all relevant arguments are heard and considered. The chair should make an
eﬀort to secure consensus on the board, especially when complicated issues
are at stake.3 Unanimous decisions on the board should be required for
constitutional issues of the ﬁrm (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Romme,
2004). The chair should also decide when, and when not, it would be useful
to have the executives partake in the meetings of the board, thus securing
the board a further measure of independence. The chair is therefore a
specialist in procedures; he or she should not have any voting rights in
order to remain truly independent. This can be compared to the task of a
judge in relation to the jury.
The neutral chair of the board should be elected by the unanimous vote of
its members. This ensures ex ante neutrality and grants him or her indepen-
dence vis-a`-vis any special faction of the board. Therefore, this person should
be an outsider to the ﬁrm and should not be connected to the ﬁrm through
previous employment or through any other capacity. Thus, we reject the
common practice of appointing former CEOs as chairpersons of the board.4
4. Potential Counterarguments
It could be argued that the proposals made on how the board should be
constituted are inadequate in various respects. We discuss four potential
major counterarguments.
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1. Professionals tend to invest less ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge than other
employees, because their higher education allows them to productively use
their knowledge in a variety of ﬁrms. Higher education means that one has
‘learned to learn’, a faculty raising ﬂexibility and adaptation to new chal-
lenges. Moreover, professionals deﬁne themselves to a high degree by fol-
lowing rules and norms developed by the respective professional community
of which they are members. These rules and norms are speciﬁc to their
particular activity and not to the ﬁrm in which they are employed (Scott,
1966; Larson, 1979). This allows them to keep valuable outside options open.
According to our proposal, they should not be represented on the board if
they fail to undertake any substantial ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments. This would
mean that their considerable knowledge cannot be used to counter the
executives’ superior knowledge. The board’s dependence on information
from the CEOs is not solved.
This argument does not take into account that, under the present cor-
porate governance system, professionals have little incentive to actively bring
their specialist knowledge to a ﬁrm. But our plan to oﬀer them representation
on the board provides them with an incentive to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge. As a compensation for the reduction in valuable outside
opportunities, they gain bargaining power in the ﬁrm they are associated
with. Thus, the counterargument mentioned starts from a static point of
view. In equilibrium, after certain adjustments have taken place, profes-
sionals will be represented on the board.
2. It could be argued that a representation of knowledge investors can be
achieved within the prevailing corporate governance system. Knowledge
investors can be remunerated by equity-based compensation, which makes
them shareholders. In that capacity, they can elect persons representing them
on the board.
This argument does not take into account that such shares in stock, given
to the knowledge investing employees, must be restricted in order to hinder a
coalition of executives and inside directors from exploiting pure ﬁnancial
investors. Such a coalition could provide incentives for rent seeking and
‘earnings management’, due to the unlimited power of increasing the
dependence of outside directors on accessing information. Stock-based
compensation, ﬁrst and foremost, gives an incentive to increase expectations,
but not performance (Martin, 2003). A coalition of both knowledge investors
and executives being shareholders might be unbeatable in manipulating
expectations of ﬁnancial investors to their own advantage.5 Financial
investors for the most part do not understand the processes of knowledge
generation in the ﬁrm. For instance, they ﬁnd it diﬃcult to evaluate the
emergence and the potential of a new technological trajectory6 in which the
ﬁrm invests.
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Therefore, knowledge investors owning shares must be forced to restrict
any advantages they have from insider information, at least in the same way
as executives owning shares are restricted. However, it is well known that
such restrictions have proved to be ineﬀective. Restrictions mean that the
respective stocks are not fully tradable and can therefore not be used as part
of a risk diversiﬁcation strategy. As a consequence, they are less valuable to
the individual restricted stockholder than the cost to the ﬁrm as a means of
remuneration. It is estimated that, under reasonable conditions, individuals
evaluate e.g. a standard option program to less than 60 percent of the cost to
the providing ﬁrm (Hall and Murphy, 2002; Meulbroeck, 2000).
3. It may be argued that our proposal is counterfactual to the trend away
from insiders in the board (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2005). This may indeed be
an empirical fact, but it does not have the expected positive eﬀects. The
explosion of executive compensation has not been halted (see e.g. Bolton,
Scheinkman and Xiong, in press). Empirical evidence also suggests that there
is no correlation between the number of outside directors and the ﬁnancial
performance of the ﬁrm (Dalton et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).
The explanation for this inconsistency may be found in the disregard of the
advisory role of directors in the dominant corporate governance discussion
(Lawler and Finegold, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, in press). Thus the
empirically observed trend goes in the wrong direction.
4. Our plan might be criticized for having similarities to German co-
determination. In German corporations with more than 2000 employees, the
board must have a 50 percent representation of the employees.7 Many
economists consider such a legal imposition a sure way to reduce ﬁrm eﬃ-
ciency (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1979) or pareto-eﬃciency (Freeman and
Lazear, 1996). It therefore seems a bad idea to imitate such co-determination.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence produces contradictory results. Some
authors argue that co-determination reduces eﬃciency (e.g. FitzRoy and
Kraft, 1993), while others ﬁnd that it raises eﬃciency (e.g. Zwick, 2004). A
comprehensive analysis of the existing empirical literature ﬁnds neither
negative nor positive eﬀects for co-determination on ﬁrm performance
(Addison et al., 2004). In any case, the empirical analyses do not make a
diﬀerence regarding the eﬀect of co-determination according to the impor-
tance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge investments. Moreover, it is important to see
that the plan here suggested is purely voluntary and should be adopted by
shareholders because the self-restriction of their power is in their enlightened
self-interest (Asher et al., 2005).8 In contrast to our proposal, which speciﬁes
a representation of employees according to the extent of knowledge invest-
ment, the rigid requirements of the German co-determination law imposes a
ﬁxed percentage of employees on the board. This regulation, in general,
produces only few knowledge investors to be represented on the board. Our
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plan provides an incentive to implement knowledge investments and
therefore raises the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm.
5. Advantages of Our Proposal
5.1. PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR KNOWLEDGE INVESTORS
It is worth repeating our plan’s greatest strength. Employees have a stronger
incentive to become knowledge investors, i.e. to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge capital. This incentive is particularly important for highly edu-
cated professionals who, under the present corporate governance conditions,
have little incentive to become more fully engaged with the ﬁrm they are
working for. Investing in ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge reduces their outside
options, and thus their bargaining position inside and outside of the ﬁrm.
These missing incentives stand in sharp contrast to the emphasis on ﬁrm-
speciﬁc knowledge as the most important competitive advantage, which is
hard to imitate. In contrast, our plan provides these incentives and con-
tributes to building up ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge capital and therewith leads to
sustainable eﬃciency rents to ﬁrms. Our proposal helps us to overcome one
important ﬂaw of the knowledge-based theory of the ﬁrm: This theory dis-
regards the incentives individuals would have to generate and transfer
knowledge.9
5.2. COUNTERVAILING THE DOMINANCE OF EXECUTIVES
Insiders, who possess great familiarity with internal processes, and with
internal tacit knowledge, can monitor the executives more eﬃciently than
outsiders can, as they are less dependent on the information provided by the
executives. In addition, their function as representatives of the employees
strengthens participation and self-governance by the corporate community as
a part of corporate governance. Anyone breaking the rules is more easily
identiﬁed by colleagues than by superiors, and can be informally admonished.
This assures that others are doing their part in contributing to the ﬁrm’s
common good, and are refraining from rent seeking. One of the most impor-
tant common goods inside companies is corporate virtue. This entails a gen-
erally shared notion of what honesty in business is about, and behaving
correctly, even when not being watched or formally sanctioned (Osterloh and
Frey, 2004). In contrast, in the case of the corporate scandals involving Enron
and WorldCom, it is well known that the dishonest behavior of top manage-
ment was common knowledge among employees (Spector, 2003). But formal,
as well as informal, accusations of malpractice or whistle-blowing have been
the exception rather than the rule. External directors have neither the necessary
information to reveal misbehavior, nor are they suﬃciently trusted to be
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approached by the employees; they are considered to be representatives of the
shareholders and, as such, perceived as opponents rather than confederates.
Another advantage of having insiders on the board stems from the insight
that process control performed by peers or insiders is perceived as a sup-
portive function rather than an external control. As has been established by
crowding theory (Frey, 1997; Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Frey and Osterloh,
2002, 2005), an intervention perceived as controlling undermines intrinsic
work motivation, while a procedural control by experts is perceived as sup-
porting (Gittell, 2000) and fair (Bies and Shapiro, 1988), crowding in intrinsic
work motivation.
5.3. STRENGTHENING INTRINSIC WORK MOTIVATION AND LOYALTY TO THE
FIRM BY DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS
Representation of knowledge workers on the board helps to prevent their
exploitation by executives and shareholders. Many employees, in particular
knowledge workers, are to a considerable extent intrinsically motivated. In
order be creative, knowledge work needs autonomy (Amabile, 1996), which is
the most important condition for becoming intrinsically motivated (Frey,
1997; Deci and Ryan, 2000). But such intrinsic motivation is undermined if
individuals feel treated unfairly or exploited, by conditions in which distrib-
utive justice is disregarded (Osterloh, 2005). At the same time, loyalty to
superiors and to the ﬁrm as a whole is diminished, as the literature on psy-
chological contracts (Rousseau, 1995) and Organizational Citizenship
Behavior (OCB) impressively shows (Organ and Ryan, 1995). To ensure that
distributive fairness can be exercised, the respective authorities must be able to
judge who has contributed what to the body of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge and
must be represented in the top decision making unit, the board. As already
argued, external directors are not in the position to perform this job. They
normally cannot judge the quantity and quality of knowledge work itself.
They are only able to evaluate the ﬁnancial eﬀects of knowledge encapsulated
in marketable products or projects carried out successfully. Only participants
in the knowledge process – who must therefore be inside knowledge workers
and peers – stand a good chance of successfully performing this job and being
perceived as acceptable evaluators by their colleagues.
5.4. STRENGTHENING INTRINSIC WORK MOTIVATION AND LOYALTY TO THE
FIRM BY PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Individuals’ intrinsic work motivation depends largely on perceived proce-
dural, and not only on distributive fairness (Tyler and Blader, 2003; Frey
et al., 2004). Moreover, following rules of fairness signals a commitment
towards partners in joint production. This creates a framing eﬀect signaling
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a partial suspension of gain driven behavior (Lindenberg, 2002, 2004). Our
proposal entails an institutional safeguard for procedural fairness in the form
of an outsider, not involved in ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment constituting a neutral
chair. This person, elected unanimously by all other members of the board,
without any voting rights on the board, has the function of an impartial
mediator. He or she is institutionally safeguarded against being subjected to
the ‘self-serving bias’. Even honest people can fall prey to this unconscious
bias, which conﬂates judgments on what constitutes fairness and what is
beneﬁcial for oneself. Unlike conscious corruption, such conﬂation cannot be
deterred by sanctions (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Bazerman et al.,
2002). However, it can be reduced, by lowering the incentives to take care of
one’s own interests. This is exactly what the institution of a neutral chair of
the board ensures and what makes him or her a credible mediator for the
shareholders, knowledge workers and executives alike.
5.5. ENSURING DIVERSITY ON THE BOARD WHILE LOWERING TRANSACTION
COSTS
The neutral chair has a second important function on the board. On one
hand, representation by shareholders and knowledge workers ensures that a
multitude of diﬀerent aspects are represented on the board. Such diversity is
important for making wise strategic decisions, in particular in diversiﬁed and
decentralized organizational structures (Child and Rodrigues, 2003). On the
other hand, diversity of interests and control rights also raises the transaction
costs of the decision-making process on the board (Hansmann, 1996), a
disadvantage which needs to be counterbalanced by the advantages of having
diversity. The neutral chairperson, as a specialist in procedures or a ‘facili-
tator’ (Grandori, 2001), is able to ﬁnd generally acceptable solutions to
conﬂicting issues.
6. Conclusions
The dominant view of corporate governance does not suﬃciently take into
consideration that a modern corporation’s key task is to generate, accumu-
late and transfer ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. It does not diﬀerentiate between
ﬁrms producing in a traditional way, based on physical work, and ﬁrms
relying mainly on knowledge work.
This paper argues in contrast that the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge has to be taken into account. Firm-speciﬁc knowledge invest-
ments are the essential basis for a sustainable competitive advantage.
Financial and knowledge investments must be combined to produce what are
commonly called synergies or quasi rents. As a consequence, these quasi
rents need to be divided in a way perceived to be fair by the participants.
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In particular, knowledge investors should not feel exploited, otherwise they
will refuse to make ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments, and will prefer to make
investments in outside options. Corporate governance must secure their ex
post bargaining position, once the (necessarily incomplete) labor contracts
have been ﬁxed. It is the board that has to take over this task.
With this end in mind, this paper advances three speciﬁc proposals:
1. The board should rely much more on insiders. The percentage of insid-
ers relative to outsiders should be determined by the relationship of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge capital to ﬁnancial capital.
2. The insiders are to be elected by, and responsible to, those employees of
the ﬁrm making ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge investments.
3. The board is to be chaired by a neutral person, whose main task is to
facilitate the board members’ engagement in a productive discourse,
which mutually beneﬁts all members of the ﬁrm. The chairperson also
has to make sure that the board members are prepared to contribute to
the ﬁrm’s common good and refrain from rent seeking.
While arguments may be raised against these proposals, they have the fol-
lowing major advantages over the reform suggested by the dominant cor-
porate governance approach. With respect to corporate governance design,
our proposals provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail
the dominance of executives; they strengthen intrinsic work motivation and
loyalty to the ﬁrm by distributive as well as procedural justice; and they
ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. With respect
to corporate governance theory, our approach takes into account insights
oﬀered by organization theory, namely that multi-party decisions, and even
conﬂicting interests, might be costly but can improve the quality of decisions
(Grandori, 2005). Moreover, our approach overcomes the separation of
theories focusing on value generation or distribution criticized by Asher et al.
(2005). We combine the knowledge-based theory of the ﬁrm, focusing on
producing a sustained competitive advantage on the one hand, with property
rights theory focusing on the distribution of residual claims on the other
hand. We thus hope to provide a step in the direction of a more adequate
theory of the ﬁrm as a basis for corporate governance.
Notes
1 See also the empirical data reported by Lawler and Finegold (2006). It shows that the
presence of insiders in the boardroom – in their case inside non-directors - enhances the
eﬀectiveness of boards considerably with respect to independence, information, communica-
tion, and performance management.
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2 While Coﬀ (1999) well develops the bargaining aspects of ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources, his anal-
ysis is static. He does not consider that employees will not invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources
if their bargaining power does not protect them from hold up.
3 See Nickerson and Zenger (2004), who argue that simple problems can be left to the mar-
ket, while problems of medium complexity to authority-based hierarchy and complex prob-
lems can be left to consensus-based hierarchy.
4 We side, in this respect, with Jensen et al. (2004).
5 Comparable to venture capitalists during the decline of the internet boom after 1997, see
Bolton et al. (in press:122).
6 Technologies typically evolve along diﬀerent technological trajectories (Teece, 1987; Dosi
et al., 1988). Usually, only one of these diﬀerent trajectories will emerge as the dominant
design.
7 The chairperson of the board, who is elected by the shareholders, has a double vote in
the case of disagreement.
8 In this respect we diﬀer from Aglietta and Reberioux (2005), who call for state regula-
tions, and do not advocate a particular model as we do.
9 With regard to this criticism, see e.g. Dosi and Marengo (2000), Osterloh et al. (2002).
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